Towards a new model of state-led development in Brazil (?) by Ricz, Judit
  
 
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences – Institute of World Economics 
 MTA Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont 
Világgazdasági Intézet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working paper 
 
215. 
 
 
       
October 2015 
 
 
 
 
Judit Ricz 
 
 
TOWARDS A NEW MODEL OF STATE-LED 
DEVELOPMENT IN BRAZIL (?) 
 
 Centre for Economic and Regional Studies HAS Institute of World Economics  
Working Paper Nr. 215 (2015) 1–51. October 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Towards a new model of state-led development  
in Brazil (?) 
 
Author: 
 
Judit Ricz 
 
research fellow 
 
Institute of World Economics 
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
email: ricz.judit@krtk.mta.hu 
 
 
 
The contents of this paper are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of other 
members of the research staff of the Institute of World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies HAS 
 
 
 
ISSN 1215-5241 
ISBN 978-963-301-624-4
  Centre for Economic and Regional Studies HAS 
Institute of World Economics 
Working Paper 215 (2015) 1–51. October 2015 
 
 
 
Towards a new model of state-led development in Brazil (?)1 
 
Judit Ricz2 
 
Abstract 
The paper investigates recent changes and evolutions of the state-led developmental approach in Brazil. 
Changes since the Millennium, documented among others by Draibe (2007), Wylde (2012), Kerstenetzky 
(2014) and Amann – Barrientos (2014) have resulted in a new policy approach, which might serve with 
some lessons for other developing countries, as well as for the revision of the classic developmental state 
concept. Using institutional and political economy approach to analyse the evolution of the Brazilian 
developmental state we argue that under the Lula administration (2003-2010) a special economic policy 
mix has emerged and institutionalized, which though maintaining some continuities to both the old 
Brazilian developmental state and neoliberal reform period, can be regarded as a new model of state-led 
development in Brazil. 
 
JEL: I38, O10, O54 
Keywords: developmental state, Brazil, new developmentalism, political economy policy 
 
 
Introduction 
Intellectual debate on the role of the state in development and state interventionism 
has been revitalized by new challenges in the twenty-first century in general and 
experiences and consequences of the recent financial and economic crisis of 2007-9 in 
particular. We aim to contribute to this debate by looking at recent development 
                                                 
1 This is a revised and edited version of the paper presented at the ‘Developmental States beyond East 
Asia’ Workshop at Newcastle University, 5 June 2015 and was supported by the 2014-16 postdoctoral 
scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and by the OTKA project No. 112069 “Varieties of 
Capitalism – Varieties of Direct Economic Intervention of the State”. 
2 Research fellow, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
Institute of World Economics, Budaörsi út 45, H-1112 Budapest, Hungary Email: ricz.judit@krtk.mta.hu 
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experiences in Brazil, and argue that the analysis of its new developmentalist approach 
might serve with some useful lessons for other countries as well as for the revision of 
the role of state in development. 
In this paper we analyse the evolution and changes of the developmental state model 
in Brazil. We critically investigate recent changes and processes in Brazil, while 
highlighting main similarities (continuities) and differences (changes) to the old 
Brazilian developmental state approach, as well as to the neoliberal period. One could 
argue that since the Millennium, and especially since the 2007-9 crisis not enough time 
has passed for a historical perspective, but in the light of 15 (or even 5-8 years), some 
trends can already be seen and based on these some preliminary conclusions might be 
formulated. 
By analysing recent trends and the new emerging policy model in Brazil our aim is to 
search for possible generalizations on the level of stylized facts regarding the changing 
role of the state in development, more concretely to draw some conclusions regarding 
the new concept of developmental state in the twenty-first century. 
The paper is in five parts: first we provide some theoretical considerations on the 
developmental regime concept providing the structural framework of thinking about the 
twenty-first century’s developmental states. Part two describes the context and the 
historical roots of the Brazilian developmental state, to help to understand the cyclicality 
of the changing role of state in development in Brazil. The third and main part of the 
paper turns to recent evolutions in Brazil and looks at the cornerstones of the new 
development model emerging since the Millennium. In the fourth part we present the 
debate regarding recent changes in Brazilian political economy and argue that it can be 
considered as a new state-led development model, while doubts remain whether it can 
be regarded as a developmental regime (overarching policy cycles). Finally we conclude. 
 
Structural framework: the concept of developmental regimes 
The need to move towards a new concept of developmental state can be verified on 
the one hand with the failure of the classic paradigm of DS (Woo-Cumings, 1999; Beeson, 
2004; Benczes, 2002; Ricz, 2015), and on the other hand with the emergence of new 
challenges in the twenty-first century, that result in a new context (possibilities and 
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constraints) for the governments in power to define and realise their main economic 
and social development goals. 
Already in the eve of the new Millennium, but even more so at the time of the writing 
of this paper (2015) it constitutes to be a common knowledge among economists3 that 
the classical model of DS has failed. It has failed in its original region (East Asia), as 
marked at the latest by the Asian financial crisis in 1997-99, and once successful East 
Asian developmental states underwent significant changes since then4. The classic DS 
model has also failed in other regions of the world, as due to its dependence on specific 
initial conditions and a unique context, it could not be successfully emulated by other 
countries in other regions of the world nor in other times as its classical “golden age” 
(mainly the middle half of the last century). 
Among the new challenges of the twenty-first century Williams (2014) highlights four 
pivotal changes that urge the revision of the old development state concept: 
restructuring of the world economy (shift to knowledge and service sectors, dominance 
of bit-driven or new economy), changing international and domestic political processes 
(expanded embeddedness and democratization); changes in the epistemic 
interpretations of development (human capabilities approach according to Amartya Sen 
(1999)) and last but not least environmental issues (ecological constraints to 
development and climate change). We wish to add a further challenge to this list, the 
challenge posed by financial globalization and the long-lasting effects of financial and 
economic crises, as these basically limit (or alter) the room for manoeuvre of individual 
states in financial terms and in raising revenues in traditional ways in the globalized 
world economy in the twenty-first century. 
Notwithstanding since the most recent global financial and economic crisis a new 
renaissance of developmental state literature can be observed. This new strand of works 
while building on the intellectual heritage of the classic DS literature, departs from it in 
several aspects (e.g. in its geographical focus, in its more comprehensive or overarching 
approach). It is out of the scope of this paper to go into detail of this newly emerging 
                                                 
3 Though not among politicians, as their seems to emerge a feeling of nostalgia and one can reveal some 
recent trials to emulate East Asian successes. These experiments and statements are rather based on 
political considerations and ‘naïve’ believes, than serious economic argumentations or facts. 
4 For a recent discussion on the existence of a new DS model in Asia see e.g. MacIntyre, Pempel and 
Ravenhill (2008), Hua – Hu (2015), Pempel – Tsukenawa (2015), Wang (2011). 
- 4 - 
Judit Ricz / Towards a new model of state-led development in Brazil (?) 
 
developmental state approach (for this see Williams, 2014; Wade, 2014; Routley, 2014), 
we aim however to provide a structural framework for the new approach, which can 
serve as a fresh attempt for analysing developmental states in the twenty-first century. 
For identifying main layers of this new developmental state approach we rely on the 
concept of developmental regime (DR) originally worked out by Pempel (1998, 1999), 
and later applied by Wylde (2012) on Latin America (mainly Brazil and Argentina) and 
by Booth (2015a, b) focusing on African developmental states. 
The mentioned authors speak about developmental regimes and not states. This 
differentiation is made consciously to depart from the very long time perspective of the 
classical DS literature (which could be evaluated ex post, only after 20-30, or even 50 
years), but also to avoid the short term perspective of developmental governments 
(mainly related to strong leaders) and not overarching political cycles. According to 
Booth (2015b:3) “the word ‘regime’ is used deliberately, to allow a focus on issues lying 
somewhere between long term of state formation and the short term of particular 
government administrations”. Thus we can see the word regime is not used as in the 
literature of international relations theories or in new political economy theories. 
Without going into details of epistemic debates on regimes or states, in this paper we 
will use the terms developmental states and regimes as synonyms, and always explicitly 
signal whether we speak about the old, classic paradigm of DS or the new emerging 
concept of DS also called DR. 
Both Pempel (1998, 1999) and Booth (2015a,b) speak about a tripod system of 
developmental regime. The main difference between them is that while the original DR 
concept (of Pempel) concentrates more on structures and processes, its later version (by 
Booth) is more concerned with the outcomes, results of the processes. To illustrate this, 
we match the appropriate layers of the two concepts side by side in the following table. 
Table 1: Three layers in the new concept of developmental regimes 
According to Pempel (1998, 1999) According to Booth (2015a,b) 
1. socio-economic alliances  1. character of political settlements 
2. political-economic institutions 2. quality of policy-making process 
3. public policy profiles 3. content of relevant policies  
In the following sections we aim to illustrate how the above presented challenges 
have influenced the emerging new developmental state model in Brazil and have 
resulted in changes (while also maintaining some continuities) to the old development-
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oriented approach. For this we aim to apply the above sketched structure to present the 
new Brazilian development model and aim to say something about the new socio-
economic alliances, changes in the policy-making process and the content (or bias) of 
relevant public policies. Though some changes date back to the late 1980s, early 1990s, 
the contours of the new developmental regime have been manifested since the 
Millennium, more concretely since the first Lula administration (2003). 
 
Contextualisation of the New Developmental State in Brazil 
In this section we shortly introduce some aspects of the specific context in which the 
new Brazilian development model emerged. First we present some aspects of regional 
political changes, then we make a note on the global economic context during the so 
called golden decade between 1997 and 2007, and finally we refer to historical roots of 
developmentalism in Brazil and the cyclicality of state activism during the last century. 
The regional political context: “turn to the left” in Latin America 
Before explicitly turning to analyse recent processes in Brazil, it is useful to embed 
these changes in a wider Latin American context. State-led and market-oriented 
development models have been altering in Latin America (as in Brazil) in different time 
periods, though this cyclicality showed some variations throughout different countries. 
With the words of Kingstone (2011:8) however, by the Millennium it became clear that 
neither state-led nor market-led approaches to development have lived up to its 
promises, meaning to result in considerable and sustainable improvements in human 
wellbeing in the Southern continent. 
This overall disappointment with previous economic models and regimes has led to 
the so called ‘turn to the left’, or ‘pink tide’, meaning that between 1998 and 2015 leftist 
presidents were elected in 15 Latin American countries5, and resulting that more than 
three quarter of the population of the Southern continent has been governed by leftist 
governments. These leftist governments have varied in the degree of departure from 
market-oriented economic policies, but all have introduced or strengthened 
                                                 
5 As the first milestone for these changes most authors mention the election of Hugo Chavez in 1998 for 
president in Venezuela, followed by other countries: Chile (2000), Brazil (2002), Argentina (2003), 
Dominican Republic (2004), Uruguay (2004), Bolivia (2005), Nicaragua (2006), Peru (2006), Ecuador 
(2007), Honduras (2007), Guatemala (2008), Paraguay (2008), El Salvador (2009), Costa Rica (2014). 
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redistributive social policies. In spite of some common trends differences among the 
leftist regimes prevail. Roberts (2014) differentiates between contestatory left regimes6 
(like Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador), and more moderate (also called social 
democratic) regimes (like Brazil, Chile and Uruguay). In this paper we look at a classic 
example of the more moderate left regimes, the case of Brazil under Lula. 
The global economic context: commodity boom and rising demand from Asia 
During the so called golden decade between 1997-2007 the growth of the US 
economy and the emerging markets (mainly in Asia and Africa) have acted as 
locomotives for the world economy7. This economic boom was also driven by the spread 
of new information and communication technologies, the intensification of financial 
globalization, the spread of financial intermediation, low interest rates and a positive 
economic moon characterised the first part of the 2000s (and led to ‘overly optimistic’ 
expectations and indirectly to the global financial and economic crisis unfolding in 2007-
08). 
During the first decade of the second Millennium several favourable factors 
altogether have contributed to relative good economic records for the Latin American 
region in general and for Brazil in particular, and at least part of this story can be 
explained by improvements in external conditions. The rapid growth of the Asian 
economics (mainly China) and their rising demand has led to a rise in commodity prices 
(including those exported by Brazil), resulting not just significant growth in Brazilian 
exports, but also led to significant surpluses in current account balance (between 2003 
and 2007) (see also Table 1 in Annex). 
We could state finally, that nothing new is under sun: despite decade long efforts of 
the ISI period to decrease the dependence of the Brazilian economy on international 
demand for its key agricultural and mineral exports (such as coffee cotton, rubber and 
precious metals) like many other developing and emerging markets, it is still highly 
influenced by events in the global commodities market. The sharp increase in exports 
since the beginning of the 2000s has strongly contributed to the GDP growth record of 
                                                 
6 This group can be further divided: 1. left-nationalist regimes of Argentina and Ecuador, and 2. the more 
radical populist approach of Venezuela, Bolivia (and since 2007 Nicaragua). 
7 With an average yearly growth of 3.3% in the world, but with quickly growing Asian and African 
countries not rarely reaching the double of this rate (WDI, 2015). 
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Brazil, and was fueled by a sharp recovery in commodity prices as well as by the rising 
demand coming from Asia (mainly China). We will argue however in the next section, 
that within this global context Brazil has made some internal political choices, and 
pursued a special public policy mix, that has also contributed to its wider defined 
development track during the first decade in the second Millennium. 
Cyclicality of state activism in development in Brazil 
In order to better understand the new Brazilian Developmental State one would need 
a historical overview of its evolution8, as legacies of the past (such as the import 
substitution industrialization, or certain shortcomings of the democratization process) 
affect the present situation. Historical roots of state developmentalism are especially 
strong in Brazil, and could be traced even to earlier periods9, however in our short 
sketch we only look at the period beginning with 1930 up to date (2014/15). As shown 
in Table 2 certain cyclicality can be observed regarding the role of state in development, 
though the story is much more nuanced and complex than a simple “shift to the market 
and back” swing would suggest. At the end of the paper we argue that both continuity 
and change in the developmentalist and more market-oriented approach can be 
revealed. 
                                                 
8 For this see Kerstenetzky (2014), Draibe (2007) or our recent paper (Ricz, 2014). 
9 See Sikkink (1991), Schneider (1999). 
- 8 - 
Judit Ricz / Towards a new model of state-led development in Brazil (?) 
 
Table 2: Variations of economic policies 
Period Political cycle Focus of economic policies 
1930-1985 The ‘old’ developmental state Import substitution industrialization 
1930-1937 Authoritarian regime Restricted industrialization 
1937-1945 Open dictatorship (Estado Novo) 
1945-1964 Populist State (restricted 
democracy) 
Structured, heavy import substitution 
industrialization (ISI), developmentalism 
1964-1985 Military Developmentalist State Extended ISI, export-promotion 
1985-2002 Democratization and turning 
to the market 
Economic stabilization, opening up and 
structural adjustment (neoliberal 
reforms) 
1985-1990 Cycle of democratization (José Sarney) New Republic, New Constitution, attempts of economic 
stabilization 
1990-1995 Failure of economic stabilization 
(Fernando Collor de Mello and Itamar 
Franco) 
Neoliberal reforms, attempts of economic stabilization, 
structural economic reforms 
1995-2002 Cycle of economic stabilization and 
liberalization (Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso) 
Real Plan and the success of economic stabilization, 
market-friendly reforms, pragmatism 
2003-2015 Towards a new 
developmental model (?) – 
Administrations of Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva and 
Dilma Rousseff 
A mix of sound macroeconomic policies 
and focus on social issues 
Source: own construction 
We distinguish three phases of the last 80 years of Brazilian state-led development: 1. 
the so called “estado desenvolvimentista”, or as we call it, the “old developmental state” 
(1930-1985), 2. the turn to the market during the neoliberal reform period, or with 
Kerstenetzky’s (2014:174) words reflecting better the Brazilian way of market-
orientation “state-led governance by the market” (1985-2002) and 3. the most recent 
new developmentalist period, the emergence of a new developmental state model (2003 – 
2015), to which we turn in the following section. 
 
Towards a New Developmental State Model in Brazil 
The main part of our paper is dedicated to the analysis of the political economy under 
the Lula period. First we provide a short general overview on the Lula administrations, 
and then try to present most important cornerstones of the new development model in 
Brazil according to the structure introduced earlier. 
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A general overview of the Lula period 
The year of 2003 marks an important cornerstone of the Brazilian economic history 
and political economy. There is however much contestation in literature, whether the 
Lula administration (2003-2010) represents continuity or rather change with the 
market-oriented (also labelled neoliberal) economic policies of the previous period, 
more concretely with the Cardoso era. In this section we will argue that lines of both 
continuity and change can be observed, however a special policy mix is unfolding and 
characterizing a new developmentalist model, also called Lulismo, and this strikingly 
differs from the more “text-bookish” neoliberal model of the previous era, but also from 
the ‘old developmentalist’ approach of the ISI-period (1930-85). 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (from now on Lula) took office under stormy circumstances 
in January 2003: the context of external crisis, low growth and uncertain domestic 
political arena all led to speculative attack on real, and its devaluation. The first Lula 
government has had thus first to restore the confidence of the markets10, and continued 
(in contrast to all expectations among his allies as well as opponents) with the 
macroeconomic policies of his predecessor concentrating on the fight against inflation 
and public indebtedness. Regarding the first term of Lula governance it is often claimed 
that it was rather dominated by the focus on macroeconomic issues, and as a result (but 
also due to more favourable international circumstances, such as global economic 
growth and the reversal of declining terms of trade, mainly due to increased Chinese 
demand towards basic Brazilian export products) economic indicators started to 
improve from 2004. 
Annual GDP growth rates reached 4,1 % on average between 2003-2010, well above 
the previous period (1,9 % between 1990-2002), but also above Latin American, world 
or OECD averages for the same period (WDI, 2015). Though this economic growth track 
might seem moderate in Brazilian terms11, still it was accompanied with significant 
                                                 
10 ‘Letter to the Brazilian People’ (Carta ao Pavo Brasiliero) issued during the electoral campaign in June 
2002 and the institutionalization of the promises made in this letter by the agreement with IMF meant in 
practice the continuity with Cardoso’s (neoliberal or orthodox) economic policies. 
11 Compared to the so called “economic miracle” years (1967-73) with average annual growth rates of GDP 
of 11.3 % (Roett, 2011:61) or more generally to the period of the “old developmental state model” (1930-
80) reaching almost 6 % GDP growth rates on average (Maddison, 2001:74). We have argued elsewhere 
(Ricz, 2014) that this historical growth record was made possible by external factors and was not 
sustainable financially (as shown at the latest by the debt crisis of the 1980s) nor economically, socially or 
politically, thus it should not be serve as base of reference today. Still large parts of the Brazilian population 
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declines in economic volatility and inflation (Gerring et al., 2011:1738) and decreasing 
external vulnerability of the economy (with decreasing ratio of debt service both in 
terms of export or GDP and increasing levels of international reserves) (see also Table 1 
in Annex). 
At the same time Lula being a left-wing candidate immediately after taking office 
showed his commitment to social issues. In several social areas reforms have mainly 
continued changes started in the Cardoso era, but concentrated on issues left out by then 
(such as restrictions on public functionaries and the introduction of compulsory 
contributions of retirees (Draibe, 2007:276)) or took the form of institutional reforms 
(as the unification of the federal cash transfer programmes called Bolsa Família or 
PBF12). Steps towards more inclusive social policies became soon the trademark of the 
Lula administration. 
Commentators (Kerstenetzky, 2014; Cornia, 2014; Wylde, 2012) most often highlight 
that economic successes went hand in hand with social results: redistributive or 
inclusive growth took place, a surprising and new phenomenon in Brazilian, but also in 
Latin American context. Economic growth was accompanied by decreasing poverty and 
inequality. Extreme poverty (people living under 1,25 dollar a day) fell from 10 % at the 
Millennium to 3.75 % in 2012, and poverty indigence (at the 2 dollar a day rate) fell also 
from 20 % to 8 % in the same period (WB, 2015). The same trend applies for poverty 
headcount ratio at national poverty lines. Though more moderate decreases in 
inequality levels suggest the incompleteness of the improvement in distributional terms, 
the reversal of the historical increasing trend of inequalities (during times of relatively 
high economic growth) is acknowledged by most economists as a unique phenomenon. 
The Gini coefficient for Brazil has decreased to 53 % in 2012, from very high levels of 
around 60 % at the Millennium (WDI, 2015). Last but not least economic and social 
development took place under democratic conditions, and seems to contribute to a more 
sustainable path for development in almost all (economic, fiscal, social and political) 
dimensions than the old development model. 
                                                                                                                                                        
look back at this period of the Brazilian economy with nostalgia (even though these were predominantly 
the years of the military dictatorships). 
12 The “Programa Bolsa Família” was started by Cardoso, however institutional reforms and widening the 
scope of the programme meant, that overwhelming results were achieved in the Lula period. 
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Other economic and social indicators also improved: unemployment rates declined, 
formal employment and average earnings increased (see also Table 1 and 2 in Annex). 
Part of these results can be explained by favourable external conditions, however there 
seems to be emerging consensus also on positive effects of public policies. 
Beginning with 2007 the re-elected Lula was already in the position to put social 
development issues more at the heart of his economic policy agenda. This together with 
the adoption of emergency anticyclical policies in the face of the crisis of 2008 has led to 
a so called internal market alternative to circumvent bottlenecks of growth and 
employment (Boschi, 2011:37). 
During his second term Lula continued to pursue with sound macroeconomic policies. 
Brazil was not drastically affected by the recent financial and economic crisis, and also 
recovery was much quicker than in other (mainly OECD) countries. This is mostly 
explained by successful macroeconomic policies, successes in social incorporation, the 
domestic market expansion prior the crisis and anti-cyclical measures after it. Domestic 
demand was largely stimulated by government’s measures, such as expansion of social 
programmes, credit incentive policies, labour market policies, growing government 
expenditures (mainly due to the new public investment plan, the Growth Acceleration 
Programme). 
However a (rather implicit than explicit13) ideational shift in the development 
discourse has also taken place in Brazil. Bresser-Pereira calls it new developmenatlism 
(2011), Boschi (2011:37) refers to it as the “revival of state developmentalism”, although 
re-defined and re-adopted to new times. According to (Draibe, 2007) it can also be 
regarded as the move towards a new social developmental state. She calls it even new 
developmental welfare state, which might be justifiable, if we compare the new Brazilian 
DS to the classic, (North-) East Asian type developmental states. But still one has to be 
very cautious to call it welfare state, as it is basically different from European welfare 
state models. 
In the media, and even economic literature widespread criticism of the Lula period 
exists, and most critics claim that Brazil did not reach its potential growth rates due to 
“wrongheaded macroeconomic policies” (Carvalho, 2007:30; for a more detailed 
                                                 
13 Though of course a shift in rhetoric could also be revealed, in this paper we rather concentrate on 
accomplishments (economic policies and achieved results) and not on political promises or slogans. 
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analysis of macroeconomic constraints to growth see also Oreiro et al., 2012). In the next 
section however we will argue, that although growth record was less impressive than it 
could have been (or than it was expected14), it was still a steady and positive growth, 
and not least it was accompanied by improvements in other important components of 
development (e.g. several social indicators). In the next section we argue that a new 
developmental model is emerging in Brazil, and this goes beyond pure macroeconomic 
accounts, but is also more complex than providing social safety nets (or implementing 
other social policies). 
Contours of a new development model in Brazil 
Instead of providing a more detailed, more complete picture of economic policies 
under the Lula administration or looking extensively at different indicators of economic 
performance or wider defined development15, we aim to reveal core elements of the new 
developmentalist model of Lula. For this we synthetize recent economic literature 
(mainly relying on Draibe, 2007; Pinheiro et al., 2007; Carvalho, 2007; Kerstenetzky, 
2014; Wylde, 2012; Amann - Barrientos, 2014) and build upon the structure of 
developmental regimes presented in the introductory part. 
1. The level of political settlement and socio-economic alliances: a new social contract 
We start our analysis on the highest level of the DR structure, and look at the new 
social contract which resulted from the changes in political settlements and the new 
socio-economic alliances coming to fore mainly thanks to the democratization process, 
but also shaped by other factors (such as the Real Plan, some labour market changes, the 
rise of the unionist movements, and finally the victory of the Workers Party with Lula as 
president). 
To analyse the emergence, maintenance and strengthening of the new and complex 
socio-economic alliances and the resulting new social pact we first refer to three 
intrinsic momentums (of which two well precede the Lula period), and then extend on 
the content of the new social contract. 
                                                 
14 One has to be cautious with expectations in Brazil as these often refer to the economic miracle years 
between 1968-73, or the old developmental state period. See also footnote 12. 
15 For this see for example Roett (2011:109-126), Baer (2014) or Kingstone – Power (2015) 
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First and foremost the failure of the ISI development model to result in sustainable 
economic growth and substantial improvements in human wellbeing led to the loss of 
legitimacy of the military dictatorship and the democratization process started in 1985. 
The new Constitution coming to force in 1988, was a result of long-repressed social and 
political demands of masses, and unsurprisingly guaranteed wide-ranging social rights 
(to education, health and social protection) for the new social groups (mainly rural and 
informal workers), while at the same time contributed to democratizing public policies 
on a decentralized and participatory way16. 
This new Constitution has institutionalized a new social contract incorporating the 
worst off social groups in Brazil, and this new social pact is viewed as a basic 
requirement for the new developmentalist approach emerging after the Millennium. It 
led to the prioritisation of social issues, and the focus on raising living standards among 
the poorest groups and regions in Brazil. Several reforms in education (the FUNDEF17 
programme providing financing and technical support to upgrade basic education) and 
healthcare (Unified Health system, Rural Social Insurance) were put in force and new 
social assistance programmes with a special focus on groups in extreme poverty (like 
Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Família) were initiated already in the early 1990s. 
In spite of these institutional reforms the full potential of the new social contract 
could not be realised as during the first decade after the democratization accelerating 
inflation threatened to destroy the economy, and until the Real Plan in 1994 the fight 
against hyperinflation and macroeconomic stability dominated the economic agenda. 
Social tensions prevailed as social spending was cut, income distribution worsened and 
social indicators stagnated. (See also Table 2 in Annex.) 
In this turbulent and exciting times18 of the Brazilian economic history, the 
restoration of civil and political rights and democratic elections led to new patterns of 
social demands (besides higher salaries, adequate housing, education, health and social 
                                                 
16 Without compromising the progressivity of the new Constitution and the shift it meant towards a more 
inclusive development model, after the legislative euphoria new tensions came to light (Kerstenetzky, 
2014:174): social rights and public responsibilities were laid down in great, however insufficient detail 
(leaving space for discretion and imperfections in realisation and implementation). 
17 Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental. 
18 It is enough to refer to the five unsuccessful stabilization plans between 1985 and 1994 (the Cruzado 
plan of 1986; the Bresser plan of 1987; the ‘Summer’ plan of 1989; the Collor I plan of 1990 and the Collor 
II plan of 1991). 
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security – thus better social protection) resulting in extraordinary growth of civil society 
(the number of social organizations), and led also to new forms of political behaviour19 
(Draibe, 2007:261). 
At the first sight it might seem paradoxically that we recall the Real Plan, and the 
Cardoso era as the second intrinsic momentum contributing to the new social contract. 
The last decade of the twentieth century after all was characterized in Brazil with the 
breaking up with the ISI model of development and the dirigiste approach. Besides 
economic stabilization market-oriented reforms (liberalization, privatization and 
institutional changes) dominated the political agenda. 
According to Amann and Barrientos (2014:3) the success of Real Plan can be driven 
back on the one hand on the collective recognition of the exhaustion of the ISI 
development model and its financial failure (it has ‘locked in’ hyperinflation), while on 
the other hand new modes of political discourse also played an important role: Cardoso 
applied a consultative and inclusive approach. As Roett (2011) puts it besides the 
technical proficiency of the Real Plan the key reason behind its success was the building 
up of a broad political and social consensus to back Cardoso’s programme20, that brought 
together different actors across political party divides, business, trade unions and civil 
society to support the reforms. The political consensus around the stabilization plan and 
the aim of macroeconomic stability was strong enough (and has been well 
institutionalized) to ‘survive’ several changes in ruling coalitions. 
The Cardoso era (thus the period after the Real plan from 1995 to 2002) is often 
called the period of re-democratization (Arbache, 2004:13), a relative stable political 
term free of corruption scandals, characterized by unified consensus in politics and 
backed by economic stabilization. We not only recall this period as laying down the 
economic basis for the institutionalization of the newly emerged social contract, but as 
we shall see in the next sections, several other changes in policies, structural and 
institutional reforms that have contributed to the emergence of new development model 
of Brazil after the Millennium date back to this period. 
                                                 
19 The latter led to new unionism (of which Lula has been an outstanding leader since 1970s) based on 
independence or autonomy towards the state. 
20 While most economists agree that the greatest political challenge before introducing the Real Plan was 
to abolish the income indexation in the formal sector (a main source of persistent inflation). 
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The already mentioned reforms in the social subsystems were deepened during the 
Cardoso years, and a few new ones were also initiated, mainly related to health (the new 
Family Health Programme to extend health provision to lower income groups), the 
pension system (the introduction of a non-contributory pension to provide transfers to 
poorer older people and people with disabilities) and social assistance (like a 
guaranteed income scheme to focus on reducing child labour – PETI21) (Amann – 
Barrientos, 2014:7-8). These reforms have contributed to the social achievements under 
the Lula era, as the focus of social policy has been changed, to concentrate on the 
extremely poor segments of the society, and the programmes combined direct cash 
transfers to the poor with conditions to ensure human development investment (like 
children’s school attendance and primary healthcare utilization). The roots of 
productive and transformative social policies (constituting the core element of the new 
development model under Lula) were laid down during the last decade of the twentieth 
century. 
The third milestone contributing to the strengthening (or even cementing) of the 
political and social consensus behind the macroeconomic stabilization in particular and 
the new policy directions moving towards more a more market-oriented approach 
combined with more progressive social policies focusing on the poorest parts of the 
society, was the electoral victory of the Workers Party (PT22) and Lula da Silva as 
president in 2002. 
Main continuities with Cardoso’s reform agenda show the degree of collective ‘buy-in’ 
of main political parties and social groups (Amann – Barrientos, 2014:4). Commentators 
tend to highlight that though all expectations the Lula administration has not pushed 
back on reforms like privatization, market liberalization, or trade reform, which is in 
sharp contrast to some more radical Latin American counterparts (like Argentina or 
Venezuela). The core elements of the Real Plan (except the exchange rate peg) were kept 
in place, and show the continuity of macroeconomic policy, which was not only 
successful to control inflation, but also to build up and maintain the confidence of 
foreign (and domestic) investors, and thus contributed to strengthen the wide-ranging 
consensus behind the new developmental regime. 
                                                 
21 Programa de Erradicacao do Trabalho Infantil. 
22 Partido dos Trabalhadores 
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We argue however that despite all these continuities, as a result of the above 
mentioned processes, the new socio-economic alliance built up by Lula represented the 
main discontinuity with former periods of the Brazilian political economy. Wylde 
(2012:177) argues that in this new social pact diverse socio-economic groups were 
associated, mainly through the low-inflation regime, but also via different channels 
resulting from the special mix of public policies. While the support of traditional national 
elites was maintained through the continuity of their main existing constituencies, the 
inclusion of the poorest parts of the society was a new and unique phenomenon. The 
poor were bought in to support the regime via social and compensatory income 
programmes, and the overall developmental vision of the Lula regime, the new approach 
to development combining financial stability with economic growth and social justice. 
Thanks to his former local politician’s past Lula was able to incorporate also the 
moderate middle classes into these new social-economic alliances mostly via his 
convincing managerial capacities at the local level. Within the political sphere and the 
Workers Party Lula was also able to connect the political allies of the middle class with 
the trade-unionist wing, the working class. However even other more locally based 
groups have contributed to the strong coalition of interests and resulting in an (at least 
in Brazilian context) unusually strong power base for Lula and his regime. 
As Saad-Filho (2007:18) puts it the new socio-economic alliance was the result of the 
‘alliance of losers’, the interest groups who had the most suffered under the previous 
neoliberal period. He speaks about four main socio-economic groups: 1. unionized urban 
and rural workers; 2. rural and unskilled workers; 3. the prominent capitalist class; and 
4. other oligarchs, landowners and politicians based in the poorest regions of Brazil. A 
further group could be added, international investors and capitalists also supported the 
Lula regime, as their confidence was reassured by the continuity with sound 
macroeconomic policies. 
The new social contract can best be captured by the new inclusive approach to 
development defined as pro-poor or equitable growth. Nonetheless in line with Wylde 
(2012:180) it has to be highlighted that Lula’s development agenda was not a pure or 
traditional leftist agenda. The desire of more equitable distribution of income was only 
part of the story. The inclusion of the poorest parts of the society into the development 
(and growth) process was also aimed to serve as potential driver of further economic 
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growth in the future (the internal alternative of development through the unlocked 
potential of the large domestic market and the unused or underutilized economic 
potential of the poor and the informal sector). 
On the other hand we also have to add, that just because of the complex structure of 
the new social alliance behind the Lula regime (an alliance of socio-economic groups 
with very different interests) the resulting developmental agenda was a more or less 
balanced one, not overly representing or even hurting the interests of one or another 
interest group. This has resulted a more moderate and pragmatic regime (compared to 
other more radical experiments throughout Latin America). In the next section we look 
at the processes that helped to balance between the often opposing interests, as we turn 
to the level of policy-making processes and the institutionalization of the above 
presented new developmentalist bias. 
2. Questions of institutionalization and changes in the policy-making process 
On the level of policy-making we have to start the story once again with the adoption 
of the new Constitution in 1988. Besides the extensive social rights agenda, the new 
Constitution has also implied the democratization of policy-making, and resulted in 
wide-ranging decentralization processes coupled with the extension of participatory 
mechanisms. Decentralization meant thus not only that executive (and financial) 
capacity was transferred to local levels, but this was conditioned upon the setting up of 
participatory councils to include the representatives of various stakeholders. 
Pragmatism is mostly cited in a positive terms regarding the Brazilian political 
economy, and we refer to it here in the sense that economic policies target at solving 
specific problems, and reforms are bundled together to help their political approval, and 
not enacted as a pre-defined reform programme. Pinheiro et al. (2007) argue that 
pragmatism was already characterising the Brazilian policy-making during the last 
decade of the twentieth century, in the era of market reforms. They argue that ideology 
and partisan politics used to influence the implementation of market reforms in Brazil to 
a much lesser degree, than in other Latin American countries. This can however be well 
explained with the extreme fragmentation of the Brazil party system and the resulting 
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imperative to build political coalitions23 to be able to “effectively” govern the country. 
Still we argue that a marked difference of pragmatism under Cardoso and the later Lula 
period exists. During the 1990s an incomplete, flexible and mostly disconnected reform 
process took place not resulting in a coherent overall change in development strategy 
rather leading to gradual, piecemeal and contested changes (Pinheiro et al, 2007:73). In 
contrast changes and reform in the 2000s, under the Lula administrations did result in 
coherent policy mix representing a new approach to development (based on the 
capabilities approach and the inclusion of the poorest parts of the society). 
We do not claim that the developmental agenda of Lula was following a pre-defined 
exact model, or a strong ideologically loaded comprehensive package of policies. Rather 
relying on a wide electoral base consisting of different groups of the society with very 
diverse interests, and the emergence of a new social alliance, resulted in a 
developmental agenda that was a pragmatic answer balancing among these very diverse 
social tensions. 
Nonetheless there was a clear ideational shift in the understanding of development, 
moving away from the old developmentalist approach purely obsessed with economic 
growth and neglecting distributional issues. The new developmentalist approach has 
grown out from the new Constitution guaranteeing wide-ranging social rights to ensure 
a decent life to all citizens. A totally new approach compared to the exclusionary 
characteristics of the old developmental state model. Based on the new social contract 
the move towards more participatory and more consultative policy making became an 
inherent feature of the new Brazilian model. 
Amann and Barrientos (2014) argue that the forging of a cross-cutting national 
consensus was an essential innovation of the Lula administration, and the way policy 
making ensured that relevant groups across society were bought into the reform agenda 
created a ‘sense of collective ownership’, which in turn facilitated the implementation of 
the reforms. 
The main difference to the former pragmatic approach was, that under the neoliberal 
era a strong social or even political consensus in the virtues of market forces was far 
                                                 
23 Or search for other solutions as did Lula with the system of ‘mensalão”, meaning a monthly salary or 
stipend in exchange for voting for the government’s programme (for more details see Kingstone - Ponce, 
2010). 
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from widespread in Brazil. In contrast under the Lula regime, the new developmentalist 
bias of economic policies was based on the overall belief that a more equitable, inclusive 
economic growth could also help to accelerate economic growth in the future via the 
productive inclusion of large parts of the society in the development process and the 
resulting expansion of the domestic market. This pro-poor developmental vision was 
backed by strong political and socio-economic consensus and resulted in a special mix of 
economic and social policies, that mutually reinforced each other, and ex post these can 
be regarded as a new development model. 
To sum up we argue in line with Kerstenetzky (2014:186-187) that significant 
advances have been made in practices of democratic deliberation in public policy 
formulation, becoming evident in the creation of public consultation councils (e.g. 
Council for Economic and Social Development called CDES24), government and social 
movements dialogues and participatory budgeting procedures. 
These lead us to questions of institutionalization of the new developmentalist 
approach, and the specific elements of the economic and social policy mix. The list of 
examples for institutionalization within different policy areas could be very extensive. 
Here we just list some of these for illustration purposes. In the area of fiscal and 
monetary policies we mention the Fiscal Responsibility Law from 1998 or the 
independence of the Central Bank, a technocratic institution free from political 
interference, specifically responsible for low inflation through inflation targets. But the 
already mentioned ‘Letter to the Brazilian People’, and the IMF agreement in 2002, can 
also be regarded as examples of institutionalization of fiscal and monetary 
conservativism. 
In the area of social policies we have already mentioned institutional reforms 
resulting the unification of the cash-transfer programmes under the umbrella of the 
Bolsa Família, but there are other numerous examples. Such as the greater involvement 
of the private sector through increased corporate social responsibility to end poverty 
and hunger in Brazil. Besides the already mentioned the Economic and Social 
Development Council (CDES) the emerging macro neocorporatist system has 
institutionalised the new relations between the state and peak associations of capital 
                                                 
24 Conselho de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social 
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and labour. The setting up of new thematic social ministries, such as the Ministry of 
Social Development25 or the Ministry for Agrarian Development (separate from the 
Ministry of Agriculture26) is also good signal of efforts to cement the new 
developmentalist bias in the new institutional setting in Brazil. 
In other policy areas similar trends can be captured, as will be explained in the next 
section on public policies, for example the institutionalization of industrial policies and 
infrastructural investments can be seen within the framework of PAC, PITCE, PDP or the 
Greater Brazil Plan (see next section). 
There are however also challenges regarding the institutionalization of the new 
developmentalist approach, most of which will be highlighted in the section on the most 
recent period, the Rousseff administration, and raise the question whether the new 
Brazilian model can be considered as a developmental regime. 
Besides all achievements in institutionalization of the new developmentalist 
approach and democratization of policy-making, participation, consultation and public 
deliberation, Brazil is still a young democracy, with all the ‘usual’ (and at least in Latin 
America typical) shortcomings of the process. Clientelism is still one major 
characteristic in politics and leads to uneven inclusion of the new social groups, and the 
civil society in more general terms. The usual beneficiaries of the old developmentalist 
bias could mostly maintain their previously acquired rights and benefits (due to the 
expansion of the social budget during the golden years of the 2000s), and in political 
sphere this led to deals where the interests of urban as well as rural big business 
sometimes still dominate over the social development agenda. This can often be 
captured in the resulting inequalities in deliberation and participation of some 
marginalised socio-economic groups. 
To underline our argumentation it is enough to recall the recurring social protests 
and corruption scandals during the last few years also reported in the international 
media, an almost “compulsory” characteristic of all political periods in the Brazilian 
political-economic history. Though all expectations (resulting from the historical 
commitment of the Workers Party to clean governance), this did not change much under 
the Lula administrations. Kingstone and Ponce (2010:120-121) explain large parts of the 
                                                 
25 Ministerio de Desenvolvimento Social 
26 Ministerio de Desenvolvimento Agrario 
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corruption and patronage with the ways political coalitions are made up in the 
fragmented Brazilian party system and some internal mechanisms within the PT (that 
did not allow to share any competencies – in form of cabinet posts or bureaucratic 
appointments – with the coalition supporters in exchange for their votes in Congress), 
but this does not alter the significance and even less the degree of corruption and 
patronage leading to lack of accountability and too often to the lack of transparency in 
the Brazilian policy-making. 
3. The level of public policies: a special mix of economic and social policies 
The third part of our analysis consists of the level of public policies, where we 
consider the content and orientation of relevant policies for achieving main socio-
economic development objectives. 
Relying mainly on Wylde (2012) and Amann – Barrientos (2014) the following main 
policy areas can be identified at the core of the new Brazilian policy model: 1. 
macroeconomic policies: fiscal and monetary policies, 2. complementary microeconomic 
policies: growth policies and active state interventions, 3. social policies and beyond 
(incl. health, education, social assistance and labour market interventions). We will see, 
that there is not so much uniqueness in either policy area, but the factors all together 
and mutually reinforcing each other led to a particular mix of economic and social 
policies that facilitated a successful (and compared to previous periods) more stable, 
more equitable and more inclusive development trajectory. 
Economic literature and analysis tends to agree that ever since the Real Plan Brazil 
ran a very tight and conservative monetary policy, and this was continued by Lula in the 
2003-10 period. With the economic historic background of the hyperinflationary 
“traditions” it is less surprising that the first social need to come to the political agenda 
after the democratization of the country, was to end the extreme inflationary pressures 
(disproportionally affecting the poor and marginalized groups in the society). For a 
more detailed description of this “democratising imperative” see Burges (2009:202 cited 
in Wylde, 2012) or for a shorter case study that present the taming of inflation in Brazil 
as a story of democratic governance see Gerring et al. (2011). The prioritisation and the 
long-lasting consensus on the low-inflation regime from the part of the voters, led to a 
strong commitment from the part of the political elite in power. For a somewhat 
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different argumentation see Baker (2009), who drives back the prioritisation of the 
concerns with the price levels on the prevailing broader trends of consumerism in 
Brazil, as well as throughout Latin America. 
Success in the area of taming inflation is unquestionable during the Lula period. 
Inflation went down from an average of 12,3 % during the Cardoso era (1995-2002) to 
an average of 5,7 % during 2003-2009 (Fonseca, 2011:381, see also Table 1 in Annex), 
not to mention the three- and even four-digit inflation periods of the 1980s and the first 
half of 1990s. So in historic terms a considerable success: hyperinflation did not return 
to the Brazilian economy. Inflation targeting and in more general terms reaching and 
sustaining price stability was at the core of the Brazilian monetary policy. This success 
was however not without its costs: real interest rates were mostly above 10 %, with 
Selic Rate not dropping below 15 % (Carvalho – Ferrari-Filho, 2007:72). High interest 
rates had wide-ranging effects in the economy from which we highlight here that it 
constrained economic growth (due to suppression of demand through low consumption 
and investment levels). This is one of most important critic emphasized by the 
opponents of the Lula regime. 
Exchange rate policy was also put to serve the inflation control. The floating exchange 
rate regime let the Real to appreciate, and the overvalued currency dampened the 
expansion of the exports, while it encouraged competition between imports and 
domestic products – all in all it was a supplementary tool (to high interest rates) to 
secure low inflation. 
Fiscal policies of Lula went in the same direction as monetary policies described 
above. The control of the public sector deficit was at the core of the Brazilian 
macroeconomic policy. In the already mentioned Letter to Brazilian People, Lula 
promised to maintain the fiscal responsibility of the Cardoso era. The consolidated 
primary surplus of the public sector remained above 3 % under the Lula administration, 
with the exception of the year 2009, when expenditures directly linked to the PAC 
programme (aiming to remove some infrastructural bottlenecks as part of the growth 
policy) has led the primary surplus to fall under 3%. 
Fiscal conservativism (the management of the federal public debt) is among the 
mostly highlighted success stories of the Lula regime. Though the total amount of debt 
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has increased between 2003-2010, as a percentage of GDP it has decreased from above 
50 % levels, to under 40 % level (Wylde, 2012:143). The rationalisation of the 
outstanding debt stock (decreasing interest rate risks and increasing maturity) was not 
just part of the fiscal conservatism, but has also yielded an economy less exposed to 
external shocks (which was proven during the recent financial and economic crisis of 
2007-9). Critics however, once again draw attention to the anti-growth bias of such 
conservative fiscal (and monetary) policies. As Carvalho (2007:31) puts in the Brazil 
system such fiscal conservatism was only to maintain by raising taxes and curtailing 
public investments27, both directly reducing the rate of economic growth. 
The prioritisation of macroeconomic stability was welcome by international capital 
and also domestic businesses groups, but we aim to emphasize here the average voter’s 
support for the low-inflation regime and macroeconomic stability, and therefore the 
politicization of the need for good macroeconomic management as a result of the 
democratization process. 
The next policy area of the new Brazilian model is made up of complementary 
microeconomic policies to promote economic growth. In this regard we have argued in 
the previous section (against some critical voices), that the Lula regime has maintained 
strong continuities to both the former developmentalist approach, the old 
developmental state and also the neoliberal period (and its market-oriented reforms as 
trade and market liberalization and privatisation). At the core of the continuity with the 
old developmentalist approach was the strong political commitment to economic growth. 
In the case of late developing countries the ever urging pressure to catch up with the 
developed world is a traditional economic policy challenge, which has been however 
even amplified by demonstration effects of the new information communication 
technological (ICT) revolution and in more general terms by globalization. In the case of 
Brazil the main line of argumentation can be explained as follows: orthodox monetary 
policies were the key to macroeconomic stabilization, which in turn was a precondition 
to achieve higher economic growth rates. This is in stark contrast, with all the 
conventional critics, that highlight the natural tension between the mechanisms of 
maintaining low inflation and promoting economic growth (Wylde, 2012:164). The main 
channel to suppress GDP growth is through the high interest rates that were the result of 
                                                 
27 As the large proportion of the current expenditure was protected legally, or by strong interest groups. 
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the conservative monetary policies concentrating on the low inflation rates “at all costs” 
(Oreiro et al., 2012). 
Large waves of privatization took place in Brazil before Lula (between 1991-2002) 
got into power and he did not proceed further with this process28, rather tried to 
encourage qualitative changes in public-private partnerships and to attract private 
investment into the Brazilian infrastructure systems. While doing this however, the 
overall developmentalist bias was maintained also in this policy area: this means that 
the link between promoting economic growth and the desire to benefit the poorer 
sections of the society (and poorer regions of the country) can be traced. 
The Growth and Acceleration Programme (PAC29) a government infrastructural 
investment programme launched in 2007 is a cornerstone of Lula’s policies to promote 
economic growth. The PAC is an umbrella term for a complexity of infrastructural 
projects in areas such as sanitation, sewage, water, electricity, road and housing 
construction, and was planned to reach to around 250 billion USD within a four-year 
period. It could sound trivial that infrastructural shortcomings are one of the main 
bottlenecks to long term economic growth and development in Brazil. The PAC is 
however more than just a government investment programme in at least two ways. 
First, it is specifically designed to improve the lives of the poorest in Brazil (by re-
building favelas and providing basic infrastructure to these least developed areas), with 
the words of Wylde (2012:149) it aims to “act as a catalyst for social change”. Second, 
the PAC is more than a package of infrastructural projects, it has also some innovative 
elements: public-private partnerships (encouraged by tax relieves and special access to 
credit), involvement of social infrastructure (such as low-cost housing, sanitation, urban 
transport, educational facilities, etc.) and decentralized management measures. 
This complexity of the PAC programme illustrates well the interrelations between the 
core policy elements of the new Brazilian developmental regime, where economic 
growth was not aimed per se, but to improve the lives of the poorest parts of the society 
                                                 
28 However as Amann and Barrientos put it (2014:4) Lula appeared to be committed to transform the 
Brazilian economy into a competitive global player and did not reverse the process of privatization (or 
other reforms related to market or trade liberalization), as was feared by foreign investors initially based 
on their experiences in Latin American countries (like Argentina or Venezuela). 
29 Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento. 
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(and vica versa). The elements of the model must therefore be considered in their 
complexity to understand the emerging new developmentalist approach. 
Economic policies also aimed to facilitate the growth of the domestic market. In the 
case of a large country, such as Brazil, large potential for economic growth might come 
from the domestic market. Infrastructural bottlenecks hand in hand with high levels of 
poverty resulted in suppressed domestic demand and consumption. The PAC 
programme not only promoted growth directly through increasing aggregate demand by 
higher investment in infrastructure, but doing this in the poorest areas of Brazil, it 
facilitated long-term growth by its social components, as it removed barriers to increase 
private consumption, saving, and investment (Wylde, 2012: 166). 
Active industrial policy has also been at the core of promoting economic growth, and 
was institutionalised under Lula by the Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade 
Policy (PITCE) in 2003. The overall vision was to promote industrial competitiveness 
through the stimulation of innovation and to help the move towards greater value-
added production. This new pro-innovation policy approach differed from the old 
(traditional) industrial policies pursued in 1960s and 1970s that focused on expanding 
physical capacity (but maintained its sectoral focus). It also broke away from the lack of 
industrial policy that marked the 1990s, which in turn was not tied to any clear 
industrial stratagem, but focused on competitiveness. 
In 2008 the objectives of the PITCE were expanded under the rubric of the Productive 
Development Plan (PDP), to include many more sectors in the policy priorities. The PDP 
comprised various types of measures such as tax exemptions, funding, increases in 
government purchases, legal and regulatory improvements and technical support. 
Aiming to leverage the investment process, the programme focused on actions related to 
the twenty-five sectors in an endeavour to increase competitiveness. The sectoral focus 
was widened but remained, whereas the main aim to promote innovation as one of the 
basic pillars for economic growth, meant a new approach. 
To sum up PITCE and PDP can be seen as combinations of both horizontal and 
vertical instruments designed to address industrial policy objectives that extended from 
strategic choices to all economic activities. The greatest merit was that the issue of 
industrial development policy was reintroduced into the political agenda as an 
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important economic development tool. In the light of the international financial crisis, 
however the implementation of the PDP achieved more of a countercyclical role than 
exercising a transformative function in the pattern of investment in the Brazilian 
economy. In the literature significant critic addresses real results of Lula’s industrial 
policies (Almeida – Schneider, 2012), claiming that though some initial, positive results 
“China and ‘low-tech’ businesses seem to have become the real drivers of the 
government's industrial agenda” (Menezes, 2010:1). In contrast Amann and Barrientos 
(2014:6) argue that in certain sectors (though mainly connected to agriculture and 
related services as distribution and logistics, but there are also other key industrial 
areas30, and even in software development and technical services) Brazil did move up 
the value chain, which is markedly signalled by increasing added value and technological 
input, and changes in the qualitative nature of the products exported. Thus they argue 
that it is overly simplified and missing the reality to claim that Brazil’s integration with 
the global economy is simply based on low valued added and low price. 
Problems with implementation of the plans (PAC and PDP) are mostly related to 
planning rigidities, legal and judicial difficulties, high costs of financial intermediation 
and often also lack of technical and managerial capacities. In fact despite governmental 
intention and programmes according to Frischtak (2008: 310 cited by Amann – 
Barrientos, 2014:7) infrastructural spending both by the private and public sector 
declined from 3.3 % of GDP to just 2.2 % between 2001 and 2008. These shortcomings 
regarding the level and efficiency of investments led to lower (than potential) growth 
rates, and infrastructural bottlenecks still represent one of the major urging 
developmental issue in Brazil. 
To sum up however we highlight that state interventions to promote economic 
growth were mainly designed to take into account aspects of fiscal responsibility and 
social progress, and (though some difficulties in implementation and missing short term 
results) they seem to contribute or fit well into the overall development approach and 
agenda. 
                                                 
30 Most often cited example is the transportation equipment, especially aircraft construction (and 
development), where Brazil has become one of the world’s leading exporters, and the role of the state’s 
support cannot be denied in this success story. 
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Turning to the third element of the model, we look at the role of widely defined social 
policies, policies aiming at reducing poverty and inequalities, while at the same time 
including all segments of the society in the development and production process 
(transformative social policies31). 
Initially fiscal conservatism led to relative scarce resources to fund social policies, 
thus radical or comprehensive social policies were not feasible fiscally. Nor were they 
desirable politically as Lula’s middle-class and domestic bourgeois voters would not 
have supported a more radical new social contract. This did not however result in 
neglect of social development issues, on the contrary it led to some new (innovative) 
solutions. 
Immediately after the expansion of social rights in to the new Constitution in 1988 
financing the new social agenda was problematic due to macroeconomic (fiscal) 
constraints. In 1997 two specific taxes32 were introduced (for a ten year period) and 
earmarked to finance social expenditure and overcome the fiscal constraints. In 2007 
the failure to renew these taxes, and next year the impact of the financial crisis led to 
concerns regarding the financial sustainability of the increased social spending. 
However Lula (just beginning his second term after being re-elected with an even 
expanded electoral base ranging over the entire social spectrum) has managed to secure 
adequate financing for social issues through a tax reform (including the transformation 
of earmarked taxes for social expenditure into federal consumption tax (Kerstenetzky, 
2009 cited in Amann – Barrientos, 2014:9)). 
After all under the first Lula administration (between 2004-08) social spending grew 
at a moderate rate, from 12,3 to 13,1 % of the GDP (de Castro et al., 2012), however this 
growth represents an even larger increase in the absolute numbers, if taking into 
account the growth of the GDP within the same period33. During the second term the 
increasing trend of social expenditure continued, and reached levels of around 15 % of 
                                                 
31 According to Mkandawire (no year:1) the transformative role of social policies has been often 
overlooked in classic developmental state literature, while in the new generation of DS it is becoming 
more widely recognized and should be seen as constitutive element or defining feature of a new DS 
concept. 
32 A tax on financial transactions (the CMPF) and a tax on sales contributing to finance social insurance 
(the Cofins). 
33 If we compare this level of social spending to the levels in the mid 1990s, barely above 9 %, the 
difference is even more striking. 
- 28 - 
Judit Ricz / Towards a new model of state-led development in Brazil (?) 
 
GDP, one of the highest among emerging economies (while of course remaining well 
below OECD averages or the levels of the European welfare states (OECD, 2014)). As a 
result social expenditure rose in both absolute and relative terms in the 2000s reflecting 
well the new centre of gravity in Brazilian public policies. 
The most important pillar of the new social agenda was the consolidation of federal 
cash-transfer programmes to the poor, the so called Bolsa Família programme (Programa 
Bolsa Família – PBF), that represents the flagship social programme of Lula34. Though it 
was the continuation and rationalisation of former projects (started in the Cardoso era), 
clear political commitment and several institutional reforms put in place under the Lula 
administration led to new dimensions regarding social results. With a low share of total 
benefit of the Brazil’s GDP (slightly more than 0,4 %) and also constituting to a small 
proportion of households incomes (slightly less than 0,7 %) the effect of the programme 
on reducing income inequality and extreme poverty is widely accepted, though debates 
address the exact numbers quantifying its real results (Soares, 2012:7). Further reforms, 
in fact doubling the coverage of the programme and increasing its benefits, have 
resulted that the PBF at the end of the Lula period provided minimum income levels to 
almost one-quarter of the Brazilian population. 
Commentators highlight serious problems with implementation of the Bolsa Família 
programme. Though successful reforms, also aiming at by-passing old local clientelistic 
channels, political manipulation is still present in the selection procedures of eligibility. 
Lack of household level data and an overcentralized system of management lead to 
challenges regarding targeting and implementation. Notwithstanding the critics, finally 
the Bolsa Família turned out to be a low-cost and highly efficient tool of poverty 
reduction supporting effectively Lula’s Zero Hunger (Fome Zero) initiative. This type of 
social programmes (though justifiable critics35) are in line with the new developmental 
approach. Thus the PBF can be seen as a good example of applying the new paradigm of 
development in social policies, and encouraging the long-term enabling and 
                                                 
34 The PBF is part of the wider Zero Hunger (Fome Zero) initiative, a federal assistance program. The main 
aim of PBF is to increase human capital among the poor through conditional cash transfers. In short the 
Bolsa Família provides financial aid to poor Brazilian families, if they ensure that children attend school 
and are vaccinated. 
35 Besides being insufficient to lift recipients out of poverty, and still excluding a lot eligible poor people, 
most critic imply that it could lead to the increase of patronage and induce a certain dependence on 
government handouts. For more details see e.g. Lindert et al. (2007) or Hall (2008). 
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empowerment of the poor for improving their own lives through human capital 
formation and family responsibility. 
The role of social policies in the new developmentalist approach of Brazil goes 
beyond the provision of (limited) social safety nets. Important changes in other areas 
related to social issues are also important element of the new model. Kerstenetzky 
(2014:180) highlights the emphasis on capability-enhancing measures incorporated for 
example in constitutional amendments (additional funding for educational purposes 
through the FUNDEB, making education compulsory for 4 to 17 year-olds and expanding 
the reach of the social security system among others). The incorporation of new private 
actors into the implementation of social policies (through new alliances between public 
and private sectors) goes in the same direction, and a good example for this is the 
increased level of corporate social responsibility of some supermarket chains to 
contribute to the Zero Hunger initiative (Wylde, 2012:155). 
Finally reforms in the area of labour policy and industrial relations have also 
contributed to the new productive inclusion approach. Labour market interventions 
constituted to be an important element of Lula’s new social agenda: the minimum wage 
revaluation policy (that led to steady increase in real minimum wages with the aim to 
restore its purchasing power) and incentives for formalization of employment (such as 
tax simplifications, closer monitoring of existing employment) led to more formal jobs 
and higher earnings. These improvements can be dated mostly to the second term of the 
Lula administration. Real wages have grown, though only modestly, and average 
earnings started to recover in 2005, rates of total employment and formal employment 
rose (the latter declined in 1990s to 41 %, and recovered between 2005 and 2008 to 
45% (Kerstenetzky, 2014:194)). Social security coverage also expanded, and reached 
almost two thirds of the labour force in 2008 (mainly due to formalization of jobs). Still 
one has to admit, that underemployment and informal employment are high in Brazil by 
any measures, and the presidential promise of ten million new jobs, has quickly 
disappeared from Lula’s rhetoric. 
The story regarding state, business and labour relations is even more complex. One of 
the main characteristics of the old developmental regime was the suppression of the 
labour market. The fragmented and often clientelistic state corporatist regime 
underwent significant changes with the democratization process in the 1980s and a so 
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called neocorporatist system emerged. In this new regime tripartite interactions 
between government, business associations and labour unions were institutionalized 
and resulted in participation opportunities of the two latter in policy-making. Though 
sectoral chambers were swept away during the macroeconomic stabilization in the mid 
of the 1990s, industrial relations remained to represent new dimensions. 
Lula, with a labour unionist background aimed explicitly to improve government 
relations with business and labour. For this Council for Economic and Social 
Development (CDES) was created in 2003 to encourage and enable dialogue between 
state and society. According to Doctor (2007) a slow process started, which relying on 
the former corporatist traditions in Brazil, aimed at incrementally adapting and 
updating existing institutions and channels to new contexts of democracy, open 
economy and globalization. He calls this attempt the institutionalisation of macro 
neocorporatism, where the emphasis is on state relations with peak associations of 
capital and labour36. This process fits well into the wider changes under Lula, where 
social inclusion and the promotion of economic growth go hand in hand. 
Reforms on other areas of social policy were less impressive under Lula. The reform 
of the social security system was rather limited, and did not profoundly alter former 
preferences and privileges towards the middle classes. Thus distortions in social 
spending continued to contribute to high levels of inequalities within the Brazilian 
society. 
Heavy critics regarding the social achievements of the Lula period concentrate exactly 
on this latter issue by claiming that inequalities were not addressed in any systemic way 
by Lula, and the slight decrease between 2003-2010 is only a by-product of 
complementary growth policies (such as the PAC programme) that led to a more even 
distribution of the fruits of economic growth across the society. Cornia (2014) and 
others however argue, that in a period with considerable growth records decreasing 
inequalities (if only at moderate rate) have to be regarded positively (as this is rarely the 
case), and in the case of Brazil it is at least partly the result of conscious public policies. 
                                                 
36 This is in contrast for example with the meso neo-corporatism of the first half of 1990s, when the state 
sought interaction with specific sectors or professions, not necessarily involving representatives of labour, 
but providing ample opportunities for rent-seeking by certain sectoral groupings. 
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According to Wylde (2012:169) this social welfare model fits well into the overall 
picture of the Lulismo: it addressed absolute poverty, as the poor constituted a key part 
of his electoral base, but at the same time Lula maintained his policy-making within the 
market-oriented approach in order not to endanger the overall objective of economic 
growth. Poverty and inequality was addressed through a wider agenda, besides social 
policies the low-inflation regime in particular, and the decreased vulnerability of the 
economy in general, as well as the socially more balanced economic growth track all 
have contributed to an improved well-being of the poorest and most marginalized 
groups of the society. 
To sum up our argumentation regarding the role of social policies in the new 
Brazilian model of development we highlight three aspects according to Amann – 
Barrientos (2014). First and foremost the issue of financing of an extended social agenda, 
that in developing and emerging countries is often the counter-argument against the 
move towards more inclusive approach to development. In the first part of this point we 
have argued that internal policy choices (earmarked taxes) and favourable growth 
records together have resulted that financing of the expansion of social policy has been 
relatively unproblematic in Brazil in the 2000s (we will see however that changes under 
Rousseff have put an end to this ‘almost ideal’ situation). 
The second specific aspect on the role of social policies in the new Brazilian model 
concerns its productive capacity. An important innovative characteristic of the social 
policy approach in Brazil is the focus to improve the productive capacity of its new 
target groups, mainly the disadvantaged and marginalised segments of the society. 
Linkages to health and education are straightforward, as improvements in education 
lead to increased productivity, while improvements in health might lead to longer lives. 
Provision and access to service have been improved, while new social assistance (mainly 
conditional cash transfer) programmes have also led to increased motivation of families 
to utilize these better opportunities. Almost all indicators related to human development 
(including schooling and health) have improved. Public education coverage has 
- 32 - 
Judit Ricz / Towards a new model of state-led development in Brazil (?) 
 
expanded and consequently illiteracy rates fell, especially among the young37 and 
average duration of schooling has improved (see also Table 2 in Annex). 
Wide-ranging critics address qualitative disparities and other shortcomings related to 
all social (educational, health and social assistance) subsystems. It is enough to recall the 
very low rankings38 of Brazil in the PISA/OECD examinations (OECD, 2012) to underline 
inherent problems (related to funding, quality, access, etc.) of the educational system. 
Thus Kerstenetzky (2014:184) argues that notwithstanding some basic progress in 
social development, the potential for economic growth based on social investments is 
underutilized in Brazil. 
Still we argue that though some evident shortcomings the new package of social 
policies in Brazil are in line with the human capabilities approach to development 
(according to Amartya Sen (1999) and the new paradigm of development) and the 
transformative social policy approach (according to Thandika Mkandawire (2007)) and 
represents a core element of the new Brazilian model. 
Finally it is important to see, that while the achieved economic growth track of Brazil 
remained below its theoretically potential rate, and even potentials of social investments 
remained underutilized, the growth in social expenditure in Brazil is likely to have had a 
direct effect on economic growth through its effect on domestic demand. Amann and 
Barrientos (2014:13) highlight this aspect, the role of growth multipliers39 as the third 
important characteristic of the new social policy approach in Brazil. Their main 
conclusion is that the expansion of social policy in Brazil has not only resulted in 
reduction in poverty and inequality, but via the domestic demand channel it has also 
                                                 
37 In the cohort of 15-24 year olds illiteracy fell below 2 % by 2010, though adult illiteracy remained at 
high levels of around 10 % (ipeadata). 
38 Brazil ranked very low, between 54 and 60 among 65 countries in mathematics, reading and science in 
the 2012 PISA assessment of 15-year-olds. Still significant improvements were documented since 2003 in 
the Brazilian education system, resulting that in the area of mathematics Brazil was the country with the 
largest performance gains. 
39 According to IPEA estimates (2010 cited in Amann – Barrientos, 2014:13) the GDP multiplier of social 
expenditure was 1,37 in the mid-2000s, while its effect on household income growth rates was even 
higher, 1,85. Unsurprisingly expenditures on health and education services result in higher GDP 
multipliers, while social protection or assistance expenditures lead to higher multipliers for household 
income growth. Expenditure on social assistance transfers results in the highest growth of household 
income. One of the most often cited result of the new Brazilian social policy approach is, that raising the 
social transfers allocated via Bolsa Família with a budget equalling to 1 % of GDP would raise household 
income by more than 2 percentage points. 
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(directly and indirectly) contributed to economic growth and this is a very important 
and unique feature of the new Brazilian model of development. 
To sum up we have presented main policy elements of the new developmentalist 
approach of Brazil structured around three core areas (macro-, microeconomic and 
social reforms) representing together a special policy mix, the essence of the Lula model. 
Several other policy areas were left out by intention, as we tried to highlight those 
central components of the model, which make it different from previous economic 
periods, or from experiences of other countries. 
To shortly list important aspects left out from our model first we have to mention the 
agenda for state reform, and highlight at least two important aspects: first, steps towards 
the re-professionalization of the public sector and reforming the revenue collection in 
order to restore government capacities were made40; and second, improvements in 
participation in decision-making and democratic deliberation were achieved. Although 
basic elements of these latter were laid down in the New Constitution of 1988, and first 
initiatives started under the era of Cardoso, practices of participation improved under 
the Lula administration and responsiveness of public policies has been raised. Still there 
is space for critics: questions of capacity building connected with decentralization and 
subsidiarity and in more general terms deviations of legal principles and their 
implementation practices are mostly highlighted (see e.g. Zimmermann, 2014), while 
the already mentioned corruption scandals remained an inherent feature of Brazilian 
policy-making. 
It was also out of our scope of our paper to examine in detail environmental and 
agrarian dimensions of Lula’s policies. It is however inevitable to make a note also on 
this topic in the context of the new development paradigm: undoubtedly responsibility 
of the government for issues such as deforestation has been raised, at the same time 
however unintended side effects of some other policies, such as the implementation of 
the PAC might have resulted in contradictory effects. The same prevails for agrarian 
issues, were the reform process hardly moved ahead, and land concentration and thus 
                                                 
40 The reprofessionalization of public service took place mainly via new wage and career plans, and 
competitive public examinations and some results have been achieved in terms of qualified and motivated 
public employees or revenue collection (Kerstenetzky, 2014:186). We did not explicitly include these 
areas in our analysis as we do not see that the results or the approach of these policy areas could be 
considered innovative, or represent a significant novelty in Brazilian context or compared to other 
countries’ experiences.  
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the quest for a land reform remained an urging issue in Brazil41. With Kerstenetzky 
(2014:188) words “the agrarian agenda is by far the greatest frustration” of the Lula 
period. 
All in all, Lula’s governance (especially his second term) is mostly cited as a 
significant step towards a more inclusive approach to development, even though we have 
referred to some traditional shortcomings, as for example “never-ending stories” of 
political (Schneider, 2011) and state reform (Lora, 2007; Peixoto, 2011). 
In the next section we turn toward the most recent period and make an outlook to the 
administration of Dilma Rousseff to see whether the presented economic policy model, 
was a special brand of the Lula era (also called Lulismo), or has been institutionalized 
strong enough to have longer lasting effects, and go beyond political cycles. 
An outlook: The Rousseff administration (2011-2015) 
Lula ended his second term of governance in 2010, with an unprecedented level of 
popularity42, and was able to choose Dilma Rousseff to replace him. After taking office in 
January 2011 Rousseff immediately demonstrated to continue the path paved by Lula, 
but with an even stronger commitment to the social developmentalist approach. Soon 
after inauguration she pledged to end extreme poverty and set priorities in fields of 
education, health, gender equality and political reform. The Plan Brazil Without Extreme 
Poverty (Plano Brasil Sem Miséria) announced in 2011 aimed to lift 16 million Brazilians 
out of extreme poverty within a three year time period. This aim was to be achieved via 
a set of elements called productive inclusion to support employment and economic 
inclusion of the poor by promoting their access to vocational training courses, labour 
intermediation services and microcredit (WB, 2013). It is straightforward to see the 
continuation with the emphasis on raising productive capacity through transformative 
social policies as initiated under Lula. 
                                                 
41 Significant progress was achieved (mainly as a side effect of forced industrialization and the need of 
raising export revenues) in agricultural production, and Brazil became the third largest agricultural 
exporter of the world with undeniable effects on economic growth record and the trade balance. However 
this rather “accidental transformation” of Brazil to an agro-export powerhouse as Hopewell (2015) puts it, 
went hand in hand with devastating environmental and social effects, and can thus rather be considered 
as “anti-developmental” according to the new development paradigm. 
42 Not without any reason: the economy grew by 7.5% in 2010, its strongest performance in a quarter-
century. Additionally Brazil was awarded both next year’s football World Cup and the summer 2016 
Olympics Games. 
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However there are important signs of discontinuities with the Lula’s approach, 
mainly on the level of policy-making. Rousseff has moved towards more interventionist 
approach to the economic policy-making (instead of following the pragmatic, but 
consultative and participatory way of Lula’s policy-making, where institutionalization of 
policies served to build up predictability and business confidence). Discretionary type 
interventions (measures introduced mainly on ad hoc basis) into economic processes 
became dominant features (and prevailed in particularly in the energy sector and 
through industrial policy). Though Rousseff tried to put stronger focus on upgrading 
Brazil’s logistics infrastructure (seen as major bottleneck to economic development) 
through private-sector concessions, several adjustments had to be made to the original 
plans before adequate returns were offered to investors, and this led to delays in 
implementation in most of the projects. 
A deterioration in fiscal and monetary policymaking during Rousseff's first term led 
to rising inflation (6,4 % in 2014, and according to EIU (2015) estimates is expected to 
rise to 9,1 % in 2015) and a rise in the gross public debt/GDP ratio to above 60 % in 
2015 (see also Table 3 in Annex). The Rousseff’s government violated Brazil’s fiscal 
responsibility law in its first term, and this could have provided even some legal grounds 
for the opposition to seek the president’s impeachment (though finally it was not the 
case). What is however more important for our analysis, that this underlines our 
argument, that though fiscal and monetary conservativism was one of the most 
institutionalized element of the Lula regime, Rousseff was not able (or willing) to 
continue with it, and this has to be regarded as an important challenge on the mid or 
longer term. 
The industrial, technological and trade policy of the Rousseff administration is 
commonly known as the Greater Brazil Plan (Plano Brasil Maior), which followed the 
PDP. This new plan focused mainly on relief measures related to investments and 
exports as to cope with the pressures of currency appreciation and credit constraints. It 
also aimed at improving the regulatory framework for innovation, strengthening trade 
defence measures, expanding fiscal incentives and facilitating funding with a view to 
increasing the domestic value in and the competitiveness of supply chains with both 
horizontal and vertical measures. 
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Though it is too early to evaluate policies of the Rousseff government, we argue that 
less favourable international context (the prolongation of the 2008 international crisis 
and weaker economic outlook for China, and Argentina's recession) on the one hand and 
less fortunate internal policy context and choices on the other hand have resulted in a 
definitively lower growth track since 2011 (see also Table 3 in Annex): at around 2% on 
yearly average between 2011-2014, and forecasts (of around 1,2% growth rate between 
2015 and 2018) are even worse (EIU, 2015:8). Stagnation of the economy (0,1% growth 
rate in 2014) is often explained (mainly by the government side) by temporary factors, 
like extra public holidays during the football world cup in June 2014, and political 
instability prior the election in October 2014 (The Economist, 2014). 
Economists however tend to agree that besides unfavourable changes in the external 
context the Brazilian economy struggles in recovering economic growth mainly due to 
deeper internal causes, structural shortcomings: weakening in macroeconomic policies 
(fiscal laxity and excessive rely on expansion of domestic demand); discretionary 
interventionist policies (e.g. artificial repression of petrol prices and energy tariffs to 
dampen inflation, special taxes on certain industries); failure to address chronic 
problems such as deficiencies of infrastructure; underperforming state administration; 
rigid labour market regulations and last but not least the complex and “burdensome” tax 
system. Due to all these factors business confidence has been at lows last seen in 2008-9 
crisis (EIU, 2015). This, hand in hand with social protests (as of in in June 2013 and 
during the football world cup) signalled the failure of Rousseff administration to keep 
Brazil on the development path paved by Lula. In October 2014 however she got a 
second chance by winning the elections after a very turbulent election campaign. 
According to The Economist (2015) headlines: “The mistakes made by Dilma Rousseff 
during her first presidential term mean her second will be stormy”. 
Due to the short time passed since then we could end here our analysis, and we only 
refer to one (telling) element of the “stormy second period”: the unfolding corruption 
scandal involving Petrobras (the state-controlled Brazilian oil-giant) reached several 
members of the Rousseff administration (politicians from the ruling coalition, including 
the leaders of both houses of Congress). Though the president herself was not directly 
implicated, over a million people went to the streets in Brazil in March 2015 protesting 
against her and her government, and showing the lows of political capital of the Rousseff 
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regime. A second round of protests took place in mid-April, and a third on in August, 
both however with lower turnouts. The upcoming summer Olympic Games in 2016, that 
under the Lula period tended to contribute to the euphoria involving a general feeling 
the time for Brazilians has come, and that Brazil will be no longer the ‘country of the 
future’43. Under Rousseff however the preparations for the Olympics is rather an 
additional source for social dissatisfaction (as it unfavourably distorts the 
developmental agenda and funding), delays in construction and investment plans and a 
further opportunity for the occurrence of corruption scandals. 
Experiences under Rousseff show the fragility of Lula’s new model: under less 
favourable external conditions and in the context of significantly lower growth rates (or 
even in the absence of economic growth) it is a more difficult political challenge to 
maintain the focus on social development, and in turn, fiscal and in wider terms 
macroeconomic stability and good macroeconomic management are sine qua non 
conditions for achieving economic growth and wider defined development. 
According to the recent report of the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2015) the new 
Rousseff government is making some adjustments and returning to more orthodox 
macroeconomic policies, but fiscal constraints will make it very difficult for Rousseff to 
push forward the “positive agenda” of social inclusion policies. Thus the question 
remains open whether she will be able to follow (or rather to return in her second term 
to) the new developmentalist approach paved by Lula. 
 
Continuity or change? 
Much contestation in literature prevails concerning main economic policy 
characteristics of the Lula period: whether it represents a special type of neoliberalism 
or rather a new developmentalist approach. Boschi (2011:37) argues, that reforms 
under the Lula administration took place in a way, that lines of continuity dating back to 
the previous developmentalist model (such as before the era of market-oriented 
reforms) were kept. He highlights the preservation of a strategic bureaucratic nuclei and 
patterns of business relations, and regards these as constituting comparative 
institutional advantages in the era of post-neoliberal globalization. In contrast to the 
                                                 
43 As Stefan Zweig has put it in 1941. 
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emphasis placed on “path dependency”, recent debates have stressed the importance of 
corrections of previous trajectories. Most often the expansion of the social frontier and 
the new social contract are highlighted as the trademark of the new Brazilian 
Developmental State. This ‘path-creation’ is also often emphasized referring to the 
combination of inward expansion (domestic alternative) and outward-oriented global 
competition, as this approach seems to provide a more viable alternative development 
model, compared to previous regimes (focusing more on either of the two). 
Some commentators (such as Carvalho, 2007) on the other hand argue that Lula’s 
policies has been in clear continuity to Cardoso’s neoliberal regime, and economic 
success (limited due to policy failures) can be explained by favourable international 
environment. Others (e.g. Burges, 2009) claim, that Lulismo was not so much about 
changes in central features of economic policy, but solely the modes of application were 
changed. This implies that it was rather the pragmatic approach of policy-making and 
the learning-by-doing process (taking place since the democratization and not solely 
under the Lula era) has yielded the achieved developmental progress, and not a new 
developmentalist model. 
According to Gerring et al. (2011: 1737-1738) the picture is more nuanced, and Brazil 
is a typical case for pragmatic neoliberalism, representing a special mix of strict 
macroeconomic orthodoxy, flexibility on other market-oriented policies, and a 
commitment to progressive social policies. 
In contrast to the arguments that highlighted the favourable external conditions and 
the continuity with Cardoso’s policies as main driving forces behind the Lula regime’s 
development performance, we argue in line with Wylde (2012), Kerstenetzky (2014), 
Cornia (2014), Amann and Barrientos (2014) and others, that public policies also played 
a role, and these went beyond simply applying neoliberal principles and orthodox 
policies. Throughout the paper we have argued that the contours of a new 
developmental model can be traced when analysing the economic and social policy mix 
of Lula. 
Main cornerstones of this new model were structured as follows: 1. the new social 
contract - macro neo-corporatism; 2. pragmatism in policy-making, raising the quality of 
the policy-making process and institutionalization of the new developmentalist bias; 3. 
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low-inflation regime and macroeconomic stability backed by conservative fiscal and 
monetary policy; 4. strong commitment to promote economic growth and the central 
role of state interventions and active industrial policies – complementary 
microeconomic policies; 5. poverty reduction programmes (social safety nets) and 
productive inclusion – progressive social policy. Not just the particular mix of these 
policies but also (or even more importantly) complementarities and linkages between 
them constitute the new developmental approach of Lula. 
We have also highlighted that the special policy mix of the Lulismo was not the result 
of a conscious, ideology-based or ‘imitation’ process, rather an outcome of a pragmatic 
approach, a learning-by-doing process, and recent experiences under Dilma Rousseff 
have shed light on the fragility of the results and the model itself. 
From a short outlook to Rousseff’s policies one could argue that though the first and 
the last element of the new model (the new social contract and transformative social 
policies) seem to have been institutionalized strong enough, but the continuity with the 
whole model seems to falter on the macro- and micro-economic policies and on the 
interactions between the five elements, as well as the changing external context 
(resulting in much harder budgetary constraints to finance social policies and thus 
leading to unavoidable political choices on the medium and longer term).  
The most important lesson from the Brazilian experience is, as Wylde (2012:182) 
puts it: an economic growth regime and a low-inflation regime need not to be 
contradictory, “… as while a low-inflation regime may sacrifice some of Brazil’s growth 
potential, it is in order to ensure concrete gains for the poorer classes who are the most 
vulnerable to inflation. Lula has thus been a pragmatist, adapting quickly to new 
circumstances and operating within the ‘limits of the possible’ due to imperatives imposed 
on any developing country in the context of globalisation and characterised and shaped by 
the principles of neoliberalism. ” 
On the other hand we have also highlighted that the inclusion of the poorest parts of 
the society into the growth and development model of Brazil has to be seen as an 
essential attempt to develop the domestic market (via growth multipliers in work), and 
unlock the ‘dead potential’ of the poorest and the informal sector (as described 
originally by de Soto (1989), which could also serve as an important additional feature 
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of the new developmentalist model in Brazil and complement its “open economy” 
approach with a stronger domestic-orientation to get a more balanced model. 
 
Conclusions 
To conclude first we highlight some key lessons from the Brazilian case, and then turn 
towards a higher level of abstraction and try to formulate some more general 
consequences regarding the new developmental state concept of the twenty-first 
century. 
There are at least three positive and two more challenging lessons resulting from the 
analysis of the new developmental approach on Brazil. We are convinced that 
experiences of Brazil, and especially the new policy model under Lula can be useful for 
other developing or emerging countries (but also the more developed ones), at least in 
three ways: First, Lula has shown to have learned the historical lesson of the Brazilian 
political economy, that high inflation has hit the poor and most marginalised groups of 
the society the most and in any democratic regime, the inclusion of these social groups is 
an essential component of social stability and sustainability. The commitment to a low-
inflation regime was therefore a historical imperative. The second important insight 
comes from the current processes of globalisation (with heavy emphasis on financial 
globalisation), and concerns the global imperative to maintain the confidence of foreign 
capital and investors to be able to secure macroeconomic stability (and decreasing 
financial vulnerability) in an open-economy model. The third important insight of the 
Lula period (which we could call democratic or political imperative) concerns his 
abilities to form new socio-economic alliances and build up political support to his 
regime on a considerably wide electoral base, consisting of a wide-range of social groups 
with often contradictory and conflicting needs and aims. The ways and how Lula could 
balance among these led to a pragmatic approach, and in some aspects to more 
moderate results, but seems to be a more sustainable path of development, then 
previous Brazilian attempts and models (or other Latin American experiments). 
We highlight two further, more challenging implications of the Brazilian experience. 
First, though pragmatism is mostly cited in a positive terms regarding the Brazilian 
political economy (see e.g. Pinheiro et al., 2007:73). Pragmatic policy-making contains 
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however severe risks regarding the outcomes as achievements in certain policy areas 
might be destroyed by opposing trends resulting from changes in other policy areas. 
Pragmatic policy-making is thus a double-edged sword, which might lead to good results 
in hands of a strong leader with strong commitment to a well-determined 
developmental vision, but also falter under different circumstances44. We have shown in 
the outlook to the Rousseff period the fragility of the Lula model (that even has put in 
question whether the Brazilian policy model can be called a new developmental regime 
as Wylde (2012) argues using Pempel’s (1999) developmental regime theory). 
The second challenging insight from the analysis of recent Brazilian experiences 
underlines, that though economic growth should not be a developmental objective per 
se (as it should be rather development in wider sense according to the Senian 
approach), still economic growth is necessary (in the sense that it facilitates) to achieve 
advances in other areas of development. The promotion of economic growth (in a pro-
poor and equitable manner) comes back to the development agenda, and with it the 
strengthened role of the state is also legitimized (not least through a new and re-defined, 
but pro-active industrial policy). 
To sum up, we have defined key elements of the new Brazilian development model 
and highlighted, that on the level of political settlements, and the socio-economic 
alliances the building of a broad consensus among the key actors of the political 
spectrum, the business sector, the labour movement and civil society was a key 
ingredient. A new social contract helped to ensure the positive engagement with the 
reform programme, and thus was a critical element to success. 
As we have noted earlier as a result of high economic growth (driven in part by the 
global commodity boom) social expenditures could grow in both absolute and relative 
terms during the Lula period (thanks to the large expansion in fiscal space), and made it 
possible that inclusive and innovative social policies could expand without endangering 
existing constituencies. On the medium (or longer term) in the context of low economic 
growth (and taking into account the limits of the government’s revenue raising capacity 
                                                 
44 This is well illustrated by the so called „succession crisis” in many Latin American countries, where after 
the retiring of the first generational charismatic leaders of the ’pink tide’, the successors tend to get in 
trouble to follow the paths paved by the new left regimes. In most cases this leads to moves towards more 
moderate politics of the centre, but at the same time it also leads to internal challenges posed not only by 
traditional opposition groups but also by actors of their (previously) supporting constituencies. 
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– as signalled by several waves of social demonstrations during 2014 and 2015) it is 
highly unlikely the expansion of the social budget can go on, conflicts will arise over 
budgetary allocations among the traditional beneficiaries of social policy (like civil 
servants and formal sector workers) and the newly included groups (the poor and 
informal sector workers)45. This might result in tough political choices for Rousseff or 
any forthcoming government and represents an important challenge for the Brazilian 
political economy in the near future and also for the new developmentalist approach. 
Finally we close with some considerations resulting from our Brazilian case study but 
valid on a higher level of abstraction and representing some minimum requirements for 
any developmental state in the twenty-first century if it wishes to successfully 
contribute to economic and social development under the new circumstances provided 
by the new challenges as presented in the introductory part of our paper. 
The application of the human capabilities approach to development (also referred to 
as the new paradigm of development) has to be based on a new social contract 
(overarching the entire social spectrum, and especially including the poorest segments 
of the society, the disadvantages and marginalised groups) and leads to a focus on 
productive and transformative social policies, but has essential consequences for 
economic policies on both macro- and microeconomic level. Whatever innovative 
solutions and complementary policies, productive inclusion and transformative social 
policies require adequate funding, which in most cases of developing and emerging 
countries means raising social expenditures. The Brazilian case, especially under the 
governance of Lula has proved however that rising social budget must not necessarily 
endanger fiscal sustainability. 
The restructuring of the world economy and the expansion of the knowledge 
economy (and new economy) put the active role of state in promoting economic growth 
back on development agenda in the twenty-first century. The Brazilian experiences have 
shown however that the open economy approach and the domestic development 
alternative can go hand in hand and a proper balance of outward-orientation and a 
complementary focus on domestic market development might be reached. 
                                                 
45 According to Amman and Barrientos (2014:14) to financial budget of the public social insurance fund of 
2.5 million civil servants equals approximately the total amount of the Bolsa Família and the two non-
contributory pension programmes, which together cover about 20 million households.  
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Policy changes in domestic and international level (expanded embeddedness and 
globalizing values due to new information communication technologies, mass and 
community media) lead to a focus on responsiveness of policies to social needs implied 
in the prevailing social contract and finally should result in a more problem-driven, 
iterative and adaptive policy-making approach (as described by Booth, 2015a, see also 
Andrews et al., 2013) and decreasing the role of ideological debates in formulating 
public policies. 
Ever urging agrarian and environmental issues where left out from our Brazilian 
analysis, as these constitute to be rather unsuccessful elements (representing maybe the 
negative characteristics of the new Brazilian socio-economic development trajectory). It 
can be however seen even from the Brazilian experiences that agrarian and 
environmental development require an active state involvement in the twenty-first 
century to comply with a more balanced and sustainable approach of development 
(including all dimensions and components). While fiscal constraints might call for 
innovative solutions, the focus on development in agri-business and/or green 
technology might also serve as driver of economic growth in the medium or longer term. 
Last but not least our analysis has supported that explicit state interventions, in form 
of a special public policy mix is necessary to promote socio-economic development, and 
the interwoven elements of economic and social policies taken together can have larger 
effects than they do separately. However there are no generally valid recipes to 
development, development strategies are “context-specific” (contingent upon time and 
space and thus not replicable) even in the twenty-first centuries globalized world. 
However we have argued in line with Fosu (2013) that there are sufficient 
commonalities across countries to draw useful lessons for other, less successful, 
countries that share similar characteristics, currently or historically. 
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Annex 
 
Table 1: Selected economic indicators in Brazil 
 
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
GDP, PPP (current international $ millions)
a
999243 1311084 1585206 1642068 1718490 1774198 1926177 2050759 2198300 2392343 2561707 2575070 2803888 2973856 3080598 3212283 3263866
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)
a
6677 8099 9084 9279 9579 9762 10468 11017 11685 12591 13359 13308 14363 15101 15507 16032 16155
GDP growth -4,35 4,42 4,31 1,31 2,66 1,15 5,71 3,16 3,96 6,09 5,17 -0,33 7,53 2,73 1,03 2,49 0,1
a
Inflation (IPCA) (%) 1 621 22 5,97 7,67 12,53 9,30 7,60 5,69 3,14 4,46 5,90 4,31 5,91 6,50 5,84 5,91 6,41
Unemployment rate (%) 6,7 10,1 9,9 10,5 9,7 10,2 9,2 8,9 7,8 9,1 7,3 6,7 7,1
Participation rate (%) 58,1 57,9 58,6 58,6 59,2 59,8 59,3 59,0 59,0 59,5 57,6 57,5 57,3
Real minimum wage (R$) 367,67 340,46 395,38 431,30 442,31 445,39 461,97 494,13 563,59 597,65 616,04 660,52 695,61 696,23 754,88 773,45 778,98
Degree of informality 
b
57,8 58,1 58,2 57,4 56,6 55,5 54,7 53,3 51,6 50,9 47,5 47,1 46,4
Terms of trade index (average 2006 = 100) 74,5 103,2 96,2 96,0 94,7 93,4 94,2 95,0 100,0 102,1 105,9 103,2 119,7 129,0 121,5 119,0 115,0
Export of goods and services to GDP (%) 8,20 7,26 9,98 12,18 14,10 14,99 16,43 15,13 14,37 13,36 13,66 10,98 10,87 11,89 12,59 12,55
Trade balance (US$ millions) 10 752 -3 466 -698 2 650 13 121 24 794 33 641 44 703 46 457 40 032 24 836 25 290 20 147 29 793 19 395 2 399 -3 930
Current account (US$ millions) -3 784 -18 384 -24 225 -23 215 -7 637 4 177 11 679 13 985 13 643 1 551 -28 192 -24 302 -47 273 -52 473 -54 249 -81 108 -90 948
Current account balance (% of GDP)
a
1,57 1,23 0,11 -1,66 -1,46 -2,14 -2,01 -2,25 -3,39  -3,9
c
Public sector balance (in % of GDP) -2,49 -4,25 -4,52 -1,42 0,27 1,41 1,22 0,91 -0,19 -1,85 -1,86 -3,09 -2,68 -3,14 -4,44
Household final consumption (% of GDP) 59,3 64,1 64,5 64,1 61,9 61,8 60,2 60,4 60,4 59,9 59,8 62,0 60,2 60,3 61,7 62,1 62,5
Government final consumption (% of GDP) 19,3 18,6 18,6 19,2 19,7 18,9 18,3 18,7 18,8 18,7 18,6 19,4 19,0 18,7 19,3 19,6 20,2
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 20,17 19,18 19,12 18,87 17,55 17,06 18,04 17,44 18,04 19,99 21,80 18,96 21,80 21,81 20,34 20,69 20,08
FDI, net inflows (BoP, current US$ millions) 989 4859 32779 22457 16590 10144 18166 15460 19378 44579 50716 31481 53345 71539 76111 80843 96851
Total external debt (US$ millions) 123 439 159 256 236 156 226 067 227 689 235 414 220 182 187 987 199 372 240 495 262 910 277 563 351 941 404 117 440 604 482 771 556 245
Debt service (% of exports of goods, services 
and primary income)
a
22,64 38,57 85,90 70,70 71,09 67,17 47,89 46,19 38,25 28,05 23,47 23,49 19,04 19,37 15,51 28,61
International reserves  (US$ millions) 9 973 51 840 33 011 35 866 37 823 49 296 52 935 53 799 85 839 180 334 206 806 239 054 288 575 352 012 378 613 375 794 374 051
 
a WDI 
b Definition 1 according to IPEA 
c IMF (World Economic Outlook) 
 
Data: ipeadata, WDI, IMF 
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Table 2: Selected indicators on social development in Brazil 
 
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total population (prs. millions)
a
149,65 161,89 174,50 176,97 179,39 181,75 184,01 186,14 188,13 190,00 191,77 193,49 195,21 196,94 198,66 200,36
Population growth (annual %)
a
1,73 1,53 1,44 1,40 1,36 1,31 1,23 1,15 1,06 0,99 0,93 0,90 0,88 0,88 0,87 0,86
Fertility rate
a
2,81 2,50 2,36 2,32 2,26 2,20 2,14 2,07 2,00 1,94 1,90 1,86 1,84 1,82 1,81 1,80
Child mortality rate (under 5, per 1000 live births) 61,5
a
47
a
29,02 27,48 26,04 24,68 23,39 22,18 21,04 19,98 18,99 18,07 17,22 16,43 15,69 15,02
Life expectancy 66,57 68,49 70,43 70,71 71,00 71,29 71,59 71,88 72,18 72,48 72,78 73,09 73,40 73,67 73,95 74,23
Extreme poverty (1 $ a day) 19,95 15,19 15,19 13,98 15,18 13,22 11,50 9,45 8,96 7,56 7,27 6,31 5,29 5,50
Poverty (national) 41,92 35,08 35,09 34,38 35,75 33,71 30,83 26,75 25,36 22,60 21,41 18,42 15,93 15,09
GINI inequality 0,614 0,601 0,596 0,589 0,583 0,572 0,570 0,563 0,556 0,546 0,543 0,531 0,530 0,527
Income shared by the poorest 20% 2,14 2,31 2,33 2,52 2,53 2,75 2,83 2,92 2,89 3,07 3,09 3,21 3,32 3,24
Income shared by the richest 20% 48,78 47,85 47,44 47,03 46,20 45,33 45,33 44,75 43,85 43,06 42,74 41,81 41,90 41,55
Illiteracy (15-24 years old) 9,73 7,10 4,20 3,69 3,37 3,19 2,89 2,45 2,22 2,16 1,94 1,51 1,38 1,26
Illiteracy (15 plus years old) 18,67 15,53 12,36 11,86 11,59 11,45 11,13 10,48 10,10 9,97 9,70 8,58 8,66 8,52
Years of study (25 plus years old) 4,8 5,2 6,0 6,1 6,3 6,4 6,5 6,7 6,9 7,0 7,2 7,4 7,6 7,7
School frequency (7-14 years old) 84,43 85,90 96,47 96,95 97,19 97,06 97,30 97,63 97,56 97,92 98,03 98,51 98,52 98,64
School frequency (15-17 years old) 56,57 66,90 81,10 81,48 82,36 81,83 81,62 82,08 82,09 84,09 85,19 83,71 84,16 84,33
Bolsa Família total amounts of benefits (R$ millions) 439,87 549,39 686,70 831,11 905,90 1174,27 1239,04 1602,08 2012,53
Bolsa Família number of beneficiary families (millions) 6,57 8,70 10,97 11,04 10,56 12,37 12,78 13,35 13,90
 
a WDI 
 
Data: ipeadata, WDI 
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Table 3: Selected economic indicators under Rousseff administration (2011-15) 
and forecast 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
a
2016
a
GDP and income
Real GDP growth (%) 3,9 1,8 2,7 0,1 -1,5 0,5
Population (millions) 197,4 199,2 201,0 202,8 204,5 206,1
GDP per capita (US$ at PPP) 15 076 15 461 15 935 16 112 15 737 15 943
Recorded unemployment (%) 6,0 5,5 5,4 4,8 6,7 7,6
Expenditure on GDP
Private consumption (real change in %) 4,8 3,9 2,9 0,9 -1,2 0,5
Government consumption (real change in %) 2,2 3,2 2,2 1,3 -1,5 1
Gross fixed investment (real change in %) 6,6 -0,6 6,1 -4,4 -7 1,5
Exports of goods and services (real change in %) 4,8 0,5 2,1 -1,1 4,7 2,1
Imports  of goods and services (real change in %) 9,4 0,7 7,5 -1,0 -4,1 4,0
Origins of GDP
Agriculture  (real change in %) 5,6 -2,5 7,9 0,4 3 3
Industry  (real change in %) 4,1 0,1 1,8 -1,2 -5 1
Services  (real change in %) 3,4 2,4 2,5 0,7 -0,8 0,1
Fiscal and financial indicators
Public-sector balance (% of GDP)
b
-2 ,3  -1 ,8  -2 ,9  -6 ,3 -7,2 -5,7
Gross public debt (% of GDP)
b
51 ,3 54 ,8 53 ,3 58 ,9 66,5 67,4
Exchange rate R:US$ (end period) 1,88 2,04 2,34 2,66 3,18 3,29
Consumer prices (end period, %) 6,5 5,8 5,9 6,4 9,1 5,1
Lending interest rate (av; %) 43,9 36,6 27,4 32 42,6 43,3
Current account 
Trade balance (US$ millions) 26 987 16 655 -604 -6 248 9 369 16 967
Goods: exports fob (US$ millions) 255 310 241 886 241 343 224 645 219 440 234 316
Goods: imports fob (US$ millions) -228 323 -225 232 -241 948 -230 893 -210 071 -217 349
Services balance (US$ millions) -36 954 -39 995 -45 953 -48 456 -40 966 -42 225
Current-account balance (US$ millions) -70 053 -65 623 -95 441 -104 840 -67 197 -64 406
External debt and international reserves
Debt stock (US$ millions) 404 046 440 507 482 470 556 070 570 227 595 638
Debt service  (US$ millions) 59 069 45 484 83 318 86 938 96 681 101 116
Total international reserves (US$ millions) 352 010 373 147 358 806 363 551 344 436 345 706
 
a EIU forecasts 
b EIU estimates 
 
Source: EIU Brazil Country Profile, London, 07-09-2015, pp.10. 
